and other prey) or one of the much cheaper models that the funeral director somehow failed even to mention.       The Internet, powerful as it is, has hardly slain the beast that is infor- mation asymmetry. Consider the so-called corporate scandals of the early 2000s. The crimes committed by Enron included hidden part- nerships, disguised debt, and the manipulation of energy markets. Henry Blodget of Merrill Lynch and Jack Grubman of Salomon Smith Barney wrote glowing research reports of companies they knew to be junk. Frank Quattrone of Credit Suisse First Boston covered up an investigation into how his company dished out shares of hot initial public offerings. Sam Waksal dumped his ImClone stock when he got early word of a damaging report from the Food and Drug Adminis- tration; his friend Martha Stewart also dumped her shares, then lied about the reason. WorldCom and Global Crossing fabricated billions of dollars in revenues to pump up their stock prices. One group of mutual fund companies let preferred customers trade at preferred prices, and another group was charged with hiding management fees. Though extraordinarily diverse, these crimes all have a common trait: they were sins of information. Most of them involved an expert, or a gang of experts, promoting false information or hiding true in- formation; in each case the experts were trying to keep the informa- tion asymmetry as asymmetrical as possible. The practitioners of such acts, especially in the realm of high fi- nance, inevitably offer this defense: "Everybody else was doing it." Which may be largely true. One characteristic of information crimes is that very few of them are detected. Unlike street crimes, they do not leave behind a corpse or a broken window. Unlike a bagel criminal- that is, someone who eats one of Paul Feldmans bagels but doesnt